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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover for personal injuries sustained in a fall down a flight of stairs allegedly caused by
defendants' negligent maintenance of the rear entrance
to a beauty salon.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court
granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict based
on the finding that the actions of plaintiff constituted
contributory negligence as a matter of law.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff seeks reversal of the trial court's ruling
that acts of the plaintiff constituted contributory negligence as a matter of law and an order remanding the case
for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 25, 1971, plaintiff, Lulu Black, had an appointment at 2:00 o'clock p.m. at Gladys' Beauty Salon
on University Avenue in Provo, Utah. The plaintiff had
been a regular patron of Gladys' for approximately one
and one-half years. Plaintiff and her husband had intended to travel to Idaho the following day and had one
of their two automobiles being serviced for the purpose
of making that trip (Tr. p. 223). Mr. Eugene E. Black,
plaintiff's husband, had instructed Mrs. Black to pick him
up at the Courthouse at approximately 3:00 p.m. that
afternoon so that he could use her car (Tr. p. 223). This
necessitated Mrs. Black making arrangements with her
hair dresser, Mrs. Suzan Hanks, to leave the beauty salon
for a few minutes while her hair was up in curlers and go
pick her husband up so that he could use the vehicle while
Mrs. Black finished her hair appointment (Tr. p. 246).
At approximately 3:00 o'clock p.m. Mrs. Black left Gladys'
Beauty Salon to pick her husband up at the Courthouse
and made arrangements to return a few minutes later
to have Mrs. Hanks finish drying her hair and combing
it out. Mrs. Black went to the Courthouse with her hair
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in curlers and was unable to find her husband. Thereafter, she returned to Gladys' Beauty Salon to finish
having her hair dried and combed out. Plaintiff testified
that upon her return there was no parking at the front
of Gladys' Beauty Salon and, consequently, she was forced
to park on 1st East and 2nd North (Tr. p. 247). Mrs.
Black testified that because there was no parking place,
her hair was in curlers, and that the hair dryer was located
in the rear of Gladys' Beauty Salon, when she returned to
the beauty salon she chose to enter the establishment
through the rear entrance in the back of the building (Tr.
p. 247). She opened the rear door into a small landing
area. From this landing area she could walk through an
interior doorway into the rear of Gladys' Beauty Salon.
Mrs. Black testified, and the testimony of other witnesses
indicates, that both patrons and employees occasionally
used the rear door for the purpose of entering and leaving
the beauty salon (Tr. pp. 58, 156, 216, 248, 321, 385 and
386). Mrs. Black testified that on one prior occasion she
had left the beauty salon through the rear entrance (Tr.
pp. 247-248). The weather outside was clear, it was a
bright sunshiny June afternoon. As she opened the outer
doorway into the landing area, light from the outside
lighted the room and Mrs. Black stepped inside (Tr. p.
249). The door dosed behind her and she found herself
in the middle of the landing area in almost complete darkness (Tr. p. 249). Mrs. Black testified that she did not
realize that the electric overhead light inside the landing
area was out until the door closed behind her (Tr. p.
251). She testified that she did not see nor did she have
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any independent knowledge that the unguarded stairway
at the west end of the landing was there (Tr. p. 250).
When plaintiff opened the outside door and walked
into the landing area she was able to observe the door to
the inside of Gladys* Beauty Salon on the south wall of
the landing area, but was not looking at the stairway on
the west wall, nor did she have any reason to believe that
there was a stairway at the west end of the landing area.
When the outside door closed it was dark. The immediate
area was unlighted because the electric overhead light
was off or burned out. Consequently, she could see neither
the outside door through which she had just walked nor
the stairway, and there is conflicting evidence as to
whether she was able to see light from under the doorway
of the beauty salon so that she could walk towards that
direction. After the outside door closed, Mrs. Black attempted to walk towards the inside door of the Gladys'
Beauty Salon. She knew generally where the interior
door was because she had seen the interior door when the
other one was open (Tr. p. 249). She knew there was
only three or four steps, at the most, from her position
in the middle of the landing to the inside door of the
beauty salon (Tr. p. 250). She did not anticipate nor
did she know of the stairway. She was cautious and
reasonably prudent trying to avoid bumping into some
other obstacle or into some other person. Plaintiff took
two or three short steps and fell down the stairs into the
basement. As a result of this fall, plaintiff was severely
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injured, which injuries are of no consequence in so far
as this appeal is concerned.
This dispute concerns the nature of the plaintiff's fall.
At the conclusion of the evidence, defendants were granted
a directed verdict, claiming the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Plaintiff maintains that
she acted in a careful and reasonably prudent manner at
at all times. The plaintiff entered the business establishment from the rear entrance, which she had observed
other people do. Her hair was in curlers, she was conscious of her appearance, it was a more convenient access
to the rear of the establishment where the dryers were,
and the plaintiff had no reason to believe that the entrance and landing area contained an unguarded stairwell.
Plaintiff further contends that her status is that of
a business invitee, since patrons continually used this
rear entranceway. Defendants countered by asserting
that this entrance was seldom used by patrons, that Lulu
Black had the status of a licensee, to whom they owed
no duty to warn of the dangerous or defective condition
in the landing area.
ARGUMENT
P O I N T I.
A D I R E C T E D V E R D I C T B A S E D ON
CONTRIBUTORY N E G L I G E N C E AS
A MATTER OF LAW IS A DRASTIC
STEP THAT IS J U S T I F I E D ONLY
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W H E N THE PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIG E N C E I S SO C L E A R L Y E S T A B LISHED THAT R E A S O N A B L E
M I N D S CAN R E A C H NO O T H E R
CONCLUSION. T H E FACTS I N T H E
I N S T A N T CASE C L E A R L Y DEMONSTRATE THAT REASONABLE MEN
COULD D I F F E R AND T H A T T H E
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, I F
A N Y , O F M R S . BLACK, I S A Q U E S TION FOR T H E T R I E R OF FACT.
As recently as August 16, 1973, the Utah Supreme
Court stated:
"Upon a motion for a directed verdict, the trial
court is obliged to view the evidence in a light
most favorable to the party against whom it
is directed. The court will sustain the granting of a such a motion only if the evidence were
such that reasonable men could not arrive at a
different conclusion." Anderson v. Gribble,
513 P.2d 432 (Utah (1973).
As a general rule, courts are very reluctant to impose
their judgment as to what reasonable men may differ
over. This is rightly so since the existence of negligence
on the part of the plaintiff must be clearly and overwhelmingly conclusive for it to be a question of law. The defendants must cleariy establish that reasonable minds
could not differ. See State for the Benefit of Workman's
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Compensation Fund v. Columbia Hall Association, 75
N. D. 275, 27 N. W. 2d 664 (1947), and Keech v. Clements,
303 Mich. 69, 5 N. W. 2d 570 (1942).
In this case, however, the trial court has ruled that
the plaintiffs actions constituted contributory negligence
as a matter of law.
Prior to the trial, the Fourth District Court, the Honorable Maurice Harding, Judge was asked to rule on defendants' motion for summary judgment. This motion
was made upon the grounds and for the reasons that the
undisputed facts allegedly showed that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law (R. p. 47). Defendants' motion was based precisely on the same fact
situation that was indicated by the evidence presented
at trial. Judge Harding, presumably a reasonable man,
ruled:
"Unless the question of the plaintiff's contributory negligence is free from doubt, the Court
cannot pass on it as a question of law. If the
Court is in doubt whether reasonable men
might arrive at different conclusions, then this
very doubt determines the question to be one
of fact for the jury and not one of law for the
Court.
A reading of the Utah cases cited by counsel,
Sections 308 to 318 in 62 Am.Jur.2d, and the
annotations in 22 A.L.R.3d 281, 24 A.L.R.3d
388, 25 A.L.R.3d 466, and 28 A.L.R.3d 605,
leaves one very much in doubt as to what the
mythical reasonable man would hold.
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The Court, therefore, denies the motion for
summary judgment." (R. p. 58)
The plaintiff contends that a reading of the A. L. R.
3d citations, the Am. Jur. 2d citations and the Utah cases
cited in plaintiff's memorandums, would confirm the
correctness of Judge Harding's deoision and urges that
the same rationale foe applied by this Court.
The trial court's precise rationale in granting defendants' motion for a directed verdict, on the same basis as
the earlier motion for summary judgment was denied, is
stated thus:
". . . But the Court, in searching and thinking
on the matter, and the law, feels that I must
dispose of the ma/tter at this time, and it will
be my ruling on the motion that because of the
fact based on plaintiff's own testimony, that as
she opened the door and light went into the
corridor into which she was going sufficient to
enable her to see all that was there, but the fact
that she did not look directly ahead of her, but
only to the left or to the South, as she put it,
looking only to and identifying the door into
Gladys' shop, and the further fact that without having made full observations that would
have disclosed to her what was in front of her
and the direction into which she was going, and
after the door closed behind her she proceeded
in such a dark area constituted contributory
negligence as a matter of law/' (Emphasis
added) (Tr., p. 406)
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It should be noted that the Court does not appear
to base its contributory negligence ruling on the step-inthe-dark rule. Plaintiff contends that the step-m-tihe-dark
rule is customarily invoked when one steps into an area
which is completely unknown. It is usually invoked when
one is helplessly groping into the unknown, but in this
instance the plaintiff had opened the door and had seen
where she intended to walk prior to having the darkness
envelop her. She was not looking to the west where the
unguarded stairway was, and she did not anticipate that
a stairwell existed.
It appears that the Court's finding of contributory
negligence as a matter of law is based on the fact that
Lulu Black failed to look and to observe that the area
directly west of the outside doorway, which was a place
that the plaintiff did not intend to go. Instead of walking
in a westerly direction in the room, plaintiff testified on
cross examination that she intended to walk to the South
or the Southwest to get to the interior door of the beauty
salon (Tr. p. 302, lines 5-7). Plaintiff thus argues that
if one reads the precise words the court used in explaining
why it felt compelled to grant the motion for directed
verdict that the court is not invoking the step-in-the-dark
rule but merely stating that the plaintiff should have seen
what was in a direction that she did not intend to go.
It is further argued that light travels in a straight
line, that when Mrs. Black opened the door the light
illuminated the landing area and that this light may not
have illuminated the stairwell, which was below the sur-
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face of the floor, enabling her to see the steps in any
event, and that this again should have been a question
for the trier of fact. It should be remembered that there
was no overhead illumination in the room.
Another fact that precludes invoking the step-in-thedark rule is that the landing area was not enveloped in
complete darkness. After all, darkness is a relative term
(See Point III) and the record clearly shows that there
was a light shining under the door that was the inside entrance into Gladys' Beauty Salon. (Quoting from the
Transcript, page 249, lines 13 through 23) :
Question (Mr. Howard) "What did you do
when you found yourself in the dark ?"
Answer (Mrs. Lulu Black) "Well, by this
time I was quite positive that I was just as
close to one door as I was to the other, because
when I opened the door I could see the passageway to the Beauty Shop door, and I thought I
was going in that direction in the dark.
And rather than turn around I just didn't
think to turn around and go back to the door
that had closed on me. I didn't know where it
was as much as I knew where the lighted door
was. And I was going in that direction."
One of the defendants, Mr. Ralph L. Smith, supports
Mrs. Black's testimony as follows: (Quoting from the
Transcript, page 352, lines 23 to 28.)
Question (Mr. Ivie) "Now, what about the
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doorway, itself. When the door is shut and the
light is on in your salon, does the light from
your Salon show under the door?"
Answer (Mr. Ralph L. Smith) "There is a
small opening underneath that door I have
never measured it.. I t could be half an inch,
but the light shows underneath the door."
Again on page 365, lines 3 to 8, Mr. Smith states:
Question (Mr. H . Wayne Wadsworth) "And
is it a fact that three of us went over there and
closed those doors to see if the light went underneath the door?"
Answer (Mr. Ralph L. Smith) "That's correct."
Question (Mr. Wadsworth) "And did it show
underneath the door?"
Answer (Mr. Smith) "It absolutely did."
Thus plaintiff argues that from the record itself there
is revealed that: (1) The plaintiff saw where she intended to go, in a South or Southwesterly direction, not
in a Westerly direction from the open doorway, and (2)
There was testimony at the trial which indicated that
there was light under the door which revealed where
plaintiff wanted to go. Plaintiff argues that the transcript
itself precludes the application of the step-in-the-dark rule
and that the Court itself didn't even invoke this rule in
its decision.
If the record and the court's rationale precludes the
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applicability of the step-in-the-dark rule, then plaintiff
submits that the question becomes whether the failure
of Mrs. Black to look in a direction in which she did not
intend to walk is contributory negligence as a matter of
law. Plaintiff argues that it is clearly not, but rather it
is a question upon which reasonable minds can differ. It
is certainly not conclusive proof of negligence as the trial
court held.
The basic thrust of plaintiff's argument is that a ruling of contributory negligence as a matter of law is simply
a specialized example of certain circumstances in which
reasonable minds cannot differ on the standard of care
to be exercised by the plaintiff. Plaintiff submits that
reasonable minds in the instant case can easily differ
as to the existence of any negligence on her part and that,
therefore, the issue of contributory negligence should
have been submitted to the jury as a fact question.
An example of the stringent standards that courts
exact in granting non-suits or directed verdicts by holding
contributory negligence present as a matter of law is the
case of Waters v. Harris, 110 S. E. 2d 283 (N. C. 1959).
In this case a 45 year old groceryman fell on a puddle of
grease in a dark warehouse. The plaintiff had desired to
buy a refrigerated meat display case and had contacted
a dealer who took him to a warehouse where he kept
second-hand equipment. The dealer opened the door, but
did not turn on any lights and it was dark inside the
warehouse. As the plaintiff was examining a case near
the open door, the dealer said, "Come on, follow me and
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let me show you some more equipment". The groceryman
followed about a step or two behind the dealer, but slipped
and fell on a puddle of grease about 30 feet from the door.
In reversing the trial court's judgment of a non-suit, the
North Carolina Supreme Court said:
"A non-suit on the grounds of contributory
negligence will be granted only when the plaintiff's evidence establishes the facts necessary
to show contributory negligence so clearly that
no other conclusion may be reasonably drawn
therefrom." {Supra, 287)
The stringent standard referred to above even in the
so called step-in-the-dark cases is discussed at 28 A. L, R.
3d, page 616:
"The step-in-thedark rule is not an absolute
rule of law. It is merely a specialized example
of certain circumstances in which reasonable
minds cannot differ on the standard of care to
be exercised by a plaintiff. Even when the facts
of the case fit squarely within the terms of the
rule, other facts may render it inapplicable, as
where the plaintiff could reasonably expect no
danger in a given situation, an ordinarily prudent person might be lulled into a false sense
of security, or plaintiff exercised caution commensurate with the circumstances. Moreover
the rule is inapplicable where any of its elements is absent, as where the plaintiff was not
unfamiliar with the place where he walked . . . "
((Emphasis added)
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Plaintiff submits that the usual cliche that each case
must be decided on the particular facts is even more compelling when the question of the presence of contributory
negligence as a matter of law is posed. Each case must
turn on its own facts. This is true even when one gropes
his way in the dark.
The Court in Palmer v. Boston Penny Savings Bank,
301 Mass. 540, 17 N. E. 2d 899, 28 A. L. R. 3d 605 at
692, upheld the jury's verdict in finding that a parking
garage patron was not contributorily negligent in entering the garage through a darkened door at 2:00 a.m. to
get his car. The patron left his car in the garage at about
6:00 o'clock p.m. and had walked out by the large center
door which served as the entryway for the vehicles. The
patron saw, a few feet West of the vehicle entrance, another door which was level with the garage. Upon returning the next day at about 2:00 o'clock a.m., the patron
found the vehicle door closed and was unable to open it
or to attract the attention of garage employees stationed
within. He then saw a door a few feet East of the vehicle
entrance and believing that it was the West door he
opened it and stepped into complete darkness inside and
fell down an iron stairway leading to the boiler room. The
court stated in overruling exceptions to the judgment
based on the jury's verdict in the patron's favor that
ordinarily one who gropes his way along in the darkness
of a strange place and falls down a stairway or into an
elevator well is lacking in due care, but the issue must
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be determined on the particular facts in each case and
was thus a jury question.
Plaintiff's remaining analysis will concentrate on
enumerating the facts which in the instant case would
cause reasonable men to differ as to whether the plaintiff
was contributorily negligent. Plaintiff contends that if
reasonable men can differ as to the presence or absence
of negligence or in other words if it is not conclusive but
questionable, then there exists a question of fact for the
jury. The following points will discuss the reasons plaintiff believes that reasonable men can differ and that,
therefore, the directed verdict was improperly granted
and that contributory negligence was a question for the
jury.
POINT II

THE REAR E N T R A N C E TO
GLADYS' BEAUTY SALON H A D
BEEN USED BY GLADYS'PATRONS
AS A MEANS OF ENTERING AND
LEAVING THE PREMISES. PLAINTIFF, LULU BLACK, H A D ON ONE
PRIOR OCCASION LEFT THE BEAUTY SALON BY MEANS OF THE
REAR DOOR AND, THEREFORE,
LULU BLACK C O U L D REASONABLY ASSUME THAT THIS ENTRANCE W A S IN A REASONABLY
SAFE CONDITION FOR HER TO USE
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ON T H E D A T E O F T H E A C C I D E N T .
Plaintiff submits that the record establishes that the
rear door to Gladys' Beauty Salon was used by many
patrons because of its convenience and that this use was
acquiesced in and in some cases even permitted by the
owners of Gladys' Beauty Salon, Mr. and Mrs. Smith.
This is fully substantiated by the evidence introduced
at trial. Mrs. Suzan Hanks testified (Tr., p. 53):
Question (Mr. Howard) "All right. During
the time you were there and prior to June 25,
1971, did you have occasion to see patrons
come and go to Gladys' establishment through
the back door?"
Answer (Mrs. Suzan Hanks) "Yes."
On page 58 of the Transcript Mrs. Hanks testified
to the names of a few of the patrons of Gladys' Beauty
Salon who were accustomed to using the back door. On
page 156 of the Transcript, Mrs. Gail Timms, another
beauty operator, testified that the back door was used
by patrons. On page 216 Mrs. Gloria Howard testified
that she frequently used the back door. On page 258
Mrs. Lulu Black testified that she had left the beauty
salon via the rear door on one prior occasion. On page 321
Mrs. Irene Wooton testified that she had occasionally
left the establishment via the back door if it was convenient. On page 385 and 386 of the record Mrs. Gladys
Smith testified that she did allow certain patrons by
specific permisson to use the back door.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mrs. Lulu Black had noted, while a patron at Gladys',
that other patrons did come and go through the back
entrance. Plaintiff argues that from these facts that there
was an implied invitation extended to her to use this
entrance as other patrons were continually doing. There
was no sign on the outside door of the building prohibiting patrons from using or entering through this rear door.
Plaintiff submits that this factual pattern gives Lulu
Black the status of a business invitee.
The testimony clearly shows that the rear door to
Gladys' Beauty Salon was used by both patrons and employees alike, that it was not always kept locked, and
that the patrons were not denied access nor were they
requested not to use this back door. The defendants, by
their actions, acquiesced in their patrons using this rear
door to gain access to the beauty salon.
The defendants have maintained that Mrs. Black is
a licensee. However, this is contrary to the recent cases
which hold that the status or classification of a person
who is upon the property of another is not to be determined by the occupants' responsibility or the degree of
care which goes to that person. Rather, the occupant in
the management of his property should act as a reasonable man in view of the probability or foreseeability of
injury to others. A person's status as a trespasser, licensee or invitee may, of course, in light of the facts giving
rise to such status, have some bearing on the question
of liability, but it is only a factor and certainly not conclusive. See Rowland v. Christian, 60 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal.
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Reporter 97, 443 P. 2d 561, 32 A. L. R. 3d 496 (1968);
Pickard v. Honolulu, 452 P. 2d 445 (Hawaii, 1969);
Levine v. Katz, 132 App. D. C. 173, 407 Fed. 2d 303, Annotation: Premises Liability — Claimant Status, 32
A. L. R. 3d 508; Mile High Fence Company v. Radovich,
489 P. 2d 308 (Colorado, 1971).
Plaintiff refers the court to its memorandum regarding the duty of due care which was submitted to the trial
court for a synopsis of modern case law on the subject.
The overwhelming weight of modern authority compels
a finding that Mrs. Black was owed a duty of ordinary
care as established by a reasonable man standard in view
of the probability and foreseeability of injury to others
resulting from the unguarded stairway; or, alternatively,
that she was a business invitee upon the premises of
Gladys' Beauty Salon and, therefore, that she was owed
that same duty of care under the circumstances.
Mrs. Black's status as a business invitee, who was
using this entrance in the same manner that other patrons
had used it, has a significant impact upon the question
of contributory negligence.
"A pedestrian's status with respect to the
premises in question bears directly on the question of his contributory negligence because it
determines what he has a right to expect if he
proceeds in darkness. A licensee takes the
premises as he finds them, but under many circumstances an invitee has a right to assume that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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they are safe for his use . . ." (Emphasis added) 22 A.L.R.3d 294.
Plaintiff argues that Lulu Black was in a place where
the public was invited. She had a right to expect safe
passageway and she had, in fact, left Gladys' Beauty Salon
through the rear entrance on a prior occasion. It was
simply not reasonable to expect a business invitee to encounter darkness and a potentially hazardous unguarded
stairway in this rear entrance which was used by numerous other patrons. As a business invitee she has the right
to expect a safe entrance and not one that is inherently
dangerous. Plaintiff submits that on this basis she is
not contributory negligent as a matter of law.
In Markley v. Wiseman, 491 P. 2d 79 (Col. App.
1971), the court stated that the distinction between a
licensee and an invitee is not controlling, but is only one
element among many to be considered in determining the
land owner's liability for personal injury to an entrant
upon his land. In this particular case the plaintiff was
an insurance salesman who obtained defendants' names
as prospective customers and made an appointment to
meet with them at their home to discuss insurance coverage. He had never been to the defendants' home prior
to the evening of the appointment. Plaintiff arrived at
the defendants' residence while it was still daylight and
spent approximately two hours in their home. As he left
the home plaintiff walked down the sidewalk toward a
gate located approximately 30 feet from the front door.
By this time it was dark. Plaintiff was able to see the
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gate, but could see no further. The only illumination in
the immediate vicinity was a 75 watt lamp over the front
door of the residence. He proceeded past the front gate
but failed to observe eight steep concrete steps descending from the gate to the street level. He had walked up
these same steps some two hours earlier. Plaintiff fell
and thereby suffered serious injuries. Upon a trial to the
court judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff.
Defendants' appealed to the Colorado Appellate Court
stating that plaintiff should have been ruled contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The Appellate Court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
It is submitted that the plaintiff, Lulu Black, stands
in a better position than the plaintiff in Markley. Mrs.
Black was totally unaware of the existence of the stairway while the plaintiff in Markley had traversed the
same steps only two hours earlier. Mrs. Black had seen
people enter and leave through the rear entrance of
Gladys' and had left through the rear entrance on a prior
occasion hersdf. She had no reason to suspect that there
was an unguarded stairway dangerously near the rear
entrance to the beauty salon.
POINT III
DARKNESS IS A RELATIVE TERM
AND T H E EXACT NATURE OF T H E
DARKNESS IS AN I M P O R T A N T
CONSIDERATION IN DETERMINING I F ONE IS CONTRIBUTORILY
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The factor of the degree of darkness in determining
contributory negligence of the plaintiff is discussed at
28A.L.R.
3d 625:
"The degree of darkness has a direct bearing
on the question of the plaintiff's contributory
negligence. The contributory negligence defense is stronger if the plaintiff walked in
total darkness than it is where the darkness was
not absolute."
Darkness is a relative term. Even the use by Lulu
Black of the term "pitch black" (Tr. p. 308) may leave
room for an interpretation that includes the presence
of some light appearing under the door. Plaintiff respectfully requests the court to refer to the earlier cited testimony on pages 249, 352, and 365 of the Transcript. The
record clearly discloses that even with the electric light
off in the landing area and the rear entrance door closed,
that light was visible from under the rear door leading
to the interior of Gladys' Beauty Salon.
It is also submitted that the degree of darkness is
important. When Mrs. Black opened the door to the
room, light shined into the landing area. She was able
to see the landing area between the outside door and the
interior door leading into the beauty shop. The annotation in 22 A. L. R. 3d 305 summarizes the court's handling
of the question of contributory negligence when one is
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suddenly plunged into a degree of darkness as happened
to Lulu Black.
"The courts have also noted, in holding not
contributory negligent one who proceeded in
a dark hall, that the hall was lighted until
plunged into darkness by the breaking of a circuit, or appeared lighted until a door closed
shutting off the light from a room.
The degree of darkness is also important, especially in Pennsylvania. I n some cases the area
in which the pedestrian walked has been held
to have been not so dark as to require him to
wait for light or assistance. I n other cases the
courts have noted, in holding a pedestrian not
to have been contributorily negligent, that he
did not proceed in total darkness: . . . " (Emphasis added)
Plaintiff submits that the record clearly discloses that
there was light under the rear door leading to the interior
of the beauty salon towards which Lulu Black was attempting to walk. The plaintiff, in attempting to walk
towards the source of light, is not conclusively negligent,
but rather it is a question of fact upon which reasonable
minds can well differ.
In Mozert v. Noeding, 76 N. M. 396, 415 P. 2d 364
(1966), the plaintiff sustained personal injuries when she
fell down an unguarded stairway in a dimly lit storeroom
of an artist's gallery when she came to the gallery to pick
up a peg board promised to her by the artist. The trial
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court rendered judgment in favor of the artist upon a
directed verdict on the question of contributory negligence at the close of plaintiff's case in chief and plaintiff
appealed. The Supreme Court held that the question of
the visitor's contributory negligence was for the jury.
The New Mexico Supreme Court stated:
" . . . I n considering the motion for a directed
verdict at the close of her case, plaintiff was
entitled to have the evidence, together with all
reasonable inferences deducible therefrom,
viewed in the light most favorable to her."
(Supra, 365.)
The court also held that in this case there was evidence from which it could be found or reasonably inferred that the plaintiff's actions were reasonable under
the circumstances and that the question of contributory
negligence was one for the jury.
The Mozert case bears some striking resemblances
to the case at bar. In both cases the plaintiff entered the
premises of the defendant either at the express or implied invitation of the defendant. Both landing areas were
small and dimly lit. There was evidence that both plaintiffs were moving cautiously as their senses of sight and
feeling directed them. Neither plaintiff had any warning
of the danger of the unguarded stairway. In Mrs. Black's
case the stairway was dangerously close to the interior
doorway into the beauty salon. Plaintiff submits that the
well reasoned opinion of the New Mexico Supreme Court
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34in Mozert v. Noeding should be applied to the facts in the
instant case.
P O I N T IV
P L A I N T I F F IS NOT CONTRIBUTORI L Y N E G L I G E N T AS A M A T T E R OF
LAW BECAUSE SHE EXERCISED
ORDINARY CARE IN E N T E R I N G
T H E R E A R DOOR OF T H E B E A U T Y
SALON.
Plaintiff submits that the question of whether Lulu
Black exercised reasonable care under the circumstances
is one for the trier of fact. As a business invitee or even
as a licensee under the well reasoned recent cases cited
previously, plaintiff is required to exercise the ordinary
care of the mythical reasonable man. Her conduct is required to be that of a prudent business invitee considering all of the surrounding circumstances.
Let us consider for a moment the manner in which
the plaintiff proceeded. She did not proceed heedlessly
and recklessly into an unknown and darkened area, but
on the contrary, entered the landing area at the rear of
Gladys' Beauty Salon prudently, carefully and circumspectfully as she had observed many other patrons doing.
Hers was certainly not an act of recklessness. Here
is how Lulu Black, herself, describes the manner in which
she proceeded:
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"Well, by this time I was quite positive that I
was just as close to one door as I was to the
other, because when I opened the door I could
see the passageway to the beauty shop door,
and I thought I was going in that direction in
the dark.
And rather than turn around I just didn't
think to turn around and go back to the door
that had closed on me. I didn't know where it
was as much as I knew where the lighted door
was and I was going in that direction." (Tr. p.
249)
This is not the description of one who is jumping
headlong into the dark unknown, but rather it is the description of a cautious prudent person proceeding to a
known destination that was lighted. Lulu Black testified
that she could see the lighted door. She proceeded toward
it cautiously. It was probably only three or four steps
away from her at the most (Tr. p. 250). Plaintiff would
argue that this cannot be contributory negligence as a
matter of law. It is the type of action that reasonable
men such as Judges Harding and Ballif can well differ
upon as to whether it constitutes contributory negligence.
Plaintiff submits that the following facts should also
be considered. The distance walked by Lulu Black after
she opened the door was very short, possibly less than
three or four steps (Tr. p. 254, line 7). The time interval
was a very short duration. Mrs. Black was thrust into
semi-darkness in not totally unfamiliar surroundings, but
she proceeded cautiously as a reasonable business invitee
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would. Plaintiff had no knowledge nor did she suspect
that there was an unguarded stairway only a few short
inches from the rear interior door into Gladys' Beauty
Salon. Plaintiff contends that under the circumstances,
when one considers all of the factors in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, that whether Lulu Black was
negligent is certainly a question upon which reasonable
minds could well differ. In Newman v. Pace, 196 Kansas
689, 413 P. 2d 1013 (1966), the Kansas Supreme Court
stated:
" I n ascertaining whether, as a matter of law, a
plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence
precluding recovery, the court must accept as
true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff along
with the reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom, disregarding testimony which is unfavorable to the plaintiff. The court may not
weigh any part of the evidence which is contradictory nor any contradicton between plaintiffs direct and cross-examination. The plaintiffs evidence must be considered liberally in
his favor and doubts resolved against defendant, and if the facts be such that reasonable
minds might arrive at contrary conclusions, the
matter of contributory negligence must go to
the jury." (Emphasis added)
CONCLUSION
Lulu Black did exercise reasonable care. She looked
towards the door to which she was walking. She did not
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notice nor had she any reason to suspect the presence of
an unguarded stairway. After the open door had closed
she thought she had only one or two more steps to take.
When the door closed Lulu Black was already in the center of the landing area. She thought she was much closer
to the inside entrance into the beauty salon than she was
to the outside door which had just closed behind her. She
could see the light underneath this interior doorway.
Plaintiff argues that however one characterizes this manner of proceeding, it certainly doesn't resemble that of
one groping helplessly in the dark. It is the action of one
to which reasonable men could well differ as to whether
these actions were so reckless as to be negligent as a
matter of law. A mere recital of the manner of her proceeding clearly demonstrates that whether her acts constituted negligence is a question upon which all reasonable minds can well differ and this is all that plaintiff
must demonstrate. In this case the question of contributory negligence should be remanded for consideration by
the jury.
Respectfully submitted,
JACKSON HOWARD, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for

Plaintiff,Appellant

120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
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